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Managerial Pay and Governance in American
Nonprofits
KEVIN F. HALLOCK*
This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the
United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992
to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the
difficulty inmeasuring performance. The article examinesmany areas commonly
studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay
differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms, pay variability within and
across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including
organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government
grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and
managerial pay in nonprofits.
Although there has been substantial work on executive
compensation in the for-profit world (Murphy 1999), very little academic
work has focused on the nonprofit sector [see Oster (1998) for a recent
exception]. This article examines several areas in the compensation of
managers of nonprofits, including pay levels, pay dispersion, pay for
performance, the effects of government grants, and governance, using
detailed panel data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on more than
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30,000 manager-years from 1992 to 1996. It is particularly difficult to
understand incentives for managers in situations like nonprofits where
performance is unusually difficult to measure or quantify (Weisbrod 1989).
This study provides an empirical analysis of several of the issues.
For a variety of reasons nonprofits provide an interesting context in which
to study the pay of managers during this period. First, nonprofits are an
important part of the economy. There are more than 1 million nonprofits in
the United States. They employ more than 10 percent of all workers and
account for about 6 percent of gross national product (GNP) (Bowen et al.
1994). Second, although there has been increased scrutiny from the IRS over
the pay of managers of firms, recent legislation has focused on the pay of top
managers of charities in the United States (Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, 1996).
This new law not only requires organizations to carefully document how
much they pay top managers, but it also requires the boards of the charities
to be able to document how the salaries of their chiefs are determined. If the
salaries are found to be higher than expected and higher than those found in
similar charities, the heads could be fined and required to return the amount
by which they were overpaid. Moreover, the members of the boards of
directors of these charities also could be fined if pay levels of the top
managers are found to be in question. The problem with this legislation is
that there are no strong guidelines for applying these laws. The third reason
nonprofits are an interesting context in which to study compensation is that
there is a theoretical literature that deals, in part, with how managers in
nonprofits may be paid, but there is almost no empirical work in the area.
The data needed to study managerial pay in nonprofits has become
available only recently. This article uses panel data on nonprofits and their
top managers from a large sample of IRS tax returns of thousands of
nonprofits for each year from 1992 to 1996 (inclusive). I also use a sample of
top executives of firms collected from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP
for comparison.
Clearly, nonprofits are different from for-profit firms (see Hansmann 1980,
1996; Mirvis and Hackett 1983; Steinberg 1990a, 1990b). However, for at
least two reasons it seems natural to study the compensation of those at the
top of nonprofits in the same way as the compensation of senior executives of
for-profit firms. First, both types of topmanagers are quite visible and clearly
focal people within their organizations. Second, recent scrutiny of nonprofits
from the IRS and others is similar to that faced by large firms in the United
States. We know a great deal about the pay of executives in large firms but
very little about compensation within nonprofits.
Researchers have studied compensation for well-educated people in the
nonprofit sector but have not concentrated primarily on top managers. For
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example, Weisbrod (1983) suggested that lawyers who work in the ‘‘public
interest’’ sector have different preferences from those who work in private
practices, and Preston (1989) found that the nonprofit/for-profit wage
differential was negative for many groups of workers but statistically more
negative for managers and professionals. She suggested that the managers
and professionals were more ‘‘closely tied to social benefit provision’’ in the
organizations and therefore were more likely to ‘‘donate’’ wages to the
nonprofits by accepting lower wages for similar work.1 Both these articles
study differences in pay levels across the for-profit and nonprofit sectors
generally. Neither studies managers or directors, nor do they consider such
a volume of data across such a wide variety of organizations.
In this article I use panel data from IRS returns on 32,146 organization-
years to examine several issues related to top executives in nonprofit
organizations. The first section briefly describes the nonprofit sector and
some reasons we might expect pay to be different in nonprofits than in for-
profit firms. The second section introduces the unique data and outlines an
industry classification system known as the National Taxonomy of Exempt
Entities (NTEE), which is similar to the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) system used for firms. The second section also includes basic summary
statistics on the pay of managers and directors by NTEE. We know from
studying large for-profit firms that there is a well-documented link between
chief executive officer (CEO) pay and organization size, but evidence for a
link between other for-profit performance measures and CEO pay is mixed.
The third section, therefore, is a discussion of measures of performance
(including organization size) and whether there is a link between managerial
pay and performance in nonprofits. The fourth section studies the
connection between government grants and managerial pay in nonprofits
and examines whether managerial pay increases in years when nonprofits
get larger grants from the government. The fifth section examines
governance and whether the size of the board of directors affects managerial
pay in nonprofits. Finally, the last section offers concluding comments.
I find that managerial pay in nonprofits is substantial and varies within
and across organizations. I also document certain possible measures of
performance of the managers of nonprofits; however, evidence linking pay
to performance is only robust when performance is measured as some
function of organization size. Also, although in the cross section it appears
that nonprofits with larger government grants pay their managers more, this
is not true within organizations. Finally, I find that the larger the number of
paid board members, the lower is the pay of the top officers and other staff.
1Also see Preston (1990, 1994) for interesting discussion of women in the nonprofit sector.
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Structure and Uniqueness of the Nonprofit Sector
Distinct Institutional Features. This section places 501c(3) (charitable)
nonprofits into the larger context of all nonprofit organizations.2 These
institutional features are discussed in order to provide a background for the
discussion of managerial pay in nonprofits that follows.
In order to become officially designated as a nonprofit, an organiza-
tion must file forms with the IRS. Such organizations do not have to
pay taxes, although if they have greater than $25,000 in annual net
revenue, they must file IRS Form 990 (described in more detail in the
data section below). Among the 28 possible groupings for nonprofits, by
far the most common designation is 501c(3), ‘‘Charitable and Religious.’’
501c(3) organizations are considered charitable because, according to the
IRS, they serve ‘‘broad public purposes include[ing] educational, religious,
scientific, and literary activities, among others, as well as the relief of
poverty and other public benefit actions’’ (Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin
1997). Table 1 shows that of the roughly 1 million nonprofit organiza-
tions in the United States in 1992 and 1996, approximately half were
501c(3) organizations. 501c(3) nonprofits have the added benefit that
contributions to the organization are deductible to the contributor.
There are at least two key features of nonprofits that distinguish them
from for-profit organizations. First, nonprofits inherently have a different
bottom line in that they are not created to generate returns to their
shareholders. Second is Hansmann’s ‘‘nondistribution constraint.’’ Hans-
mann (1980, 1996) notes that while nonprofit organizations are free to
make profits, those profits cannot be distributed to those with formal
control over the organization: ‘‘A nonprofit organization is, in essence,
an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any,
to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers,
directors, or trustees’’ (Hansmann 1980). However, this does not imply
that nonprofit organizations cannot make profits in a technical sense;
rather, ‘‘It is only the distribution of profits that is prohibited’’
(Hansmann 1980).
It is also worthwhile considering why some organizations might form as
nonprofits. Hansmann outlines several reasons. The first is that the buyer
and the recipient of goods and services are not always the same person. For
example, people are more likely to donate funds to a relief organization
2The first part of this discussion is based on Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin (1997). Also see Bowen
et al. (1994) for a detailed description of charitable nonprofits.
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organized as a nonprofit because they know that the managers are less likely
to abscond with the residual money. Another reason that an organization
may form as a nonprofit comes out of the idea of public goods (Hansmann
1980). The fact that one person enjoys the services of a public good does not
preclude others from doing the same. For example, donors are more likely to
contribute to nonprofit public radio stations because they are more likely to
believe that the funds will be used for programming rather than for the
private benefit of the managers. Museums and operas are similar in that they
practice ‘‘voluntary price discrimination’’ (Hansmann 1980) by offering
TABLE 1
Tax-Exempt Organizations Registered with the IRS in 1992 and 1995
Section Number in 1992 Number in 1995
501(c)(1) Corporations Organized Under Acts
of Congress
9 9
501(c)(2) Titleholding Corporations 6,529 7,025
501(c)(3) Charitable and Religious 546,100 626,226
501(c)(4) Social Welfare 142,673 139,451
501(c)(5) Labor, agricultural organizations 71,012 66,662
501(c)(6) Business leagues 70,871 75,695
501(c)(7) Social and recreational clubs 64,681 65,501
501(c)(8) Fraternal and beneficiary societies 93,544 92,115
501(c)(9) Voluntary employees’ beneficiary associations 14,986 14,681
501(c)(10) Domestic fraternal beneficiary societies 21,415 21,046
501(c)(11) Teachers’ retirement funds 10 11
501(c)(12) Benevolent life insurance associations 6,103 6,291
501(c)(13) Cemetery companies 9,025 9,433
501(c)(14) State chartered credit unions 5,559 5,225
501(c)(15) Mutual insurance companies 1,157 1,185
501(c)(16) Corporations to finance crop operations 23 23
501(c)(17) Supplemental unemployment benefit trusts 625 583
501(c)(18) Employee funded pension trusts 8 3
501(c)(19) War veterans’ organizations 28,096 30,828
501(c)(20) Legal service organizations 217 141
501(c)(21) Black lung trusts 23 25
501(c)(22) Multi–employer pension plans 0 0
501(c)(23) Veterans’ associations founded prior to 1880 2 2
501(c)(24) Trusts described in section 4049 of ERISA 1 1
501(c)(25) Holding companies for pensions, etc. 290 638
501(d) Religious and apostolic organizations 92 107
501(e) Cooperative hospital service organizations 68 61
501(f) Cooperative service organizations of
operating educational orgs.
1 1
521 Farmers’ cooperatives 2,086 1,810
TOTAL 1,085,206 1,164,779
Source: Adapted from Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin, State Nonprofit Almanac 1997: Profiles of Charitable
Organizations, p. 3. Original source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Annual Report and IRS Databooks, various
editions.
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low-priced seats, but those who can afford to contribute do so with the
knowledge that the residual money cannot be distributed to those in control.
Hansmann (1980) also describes ‘‘implicit loans’’ in higher education, where
students are more likely to donate money back to their nonprofit colleges
when they feel that those in charge cannot keep the money for themselves.
Another interesting and important example of an institution that
optimally may form as a nonprofit is a nursing home or day-care center
(Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986). Parents (in the case of a day-care center)
and children (in the case of a nursing home) are more likely to place their
loved ones in the care of institutions organized as nonprofits because they
believe that the additional dollar is more likely spent on quality care, food,
etc., and not on the well-being of the manager.
ReasonsWhyPayLevels forManagers ofNonprofitsMayBeDifferent. The
first possible reason for differences in pay between employees of nonprofit
organizations and for-profit firms was presented by Preston (1989), and some
of her findings may be applied to managers as I do here. The idea has to do
with ‘‘labor donations’’ and the fact that workers may trade lower pay for
higher social benefits. The limiting case of labor donations is volunteer labor,
whereworkers are paid nothing for the time they donate to an organization. If
labor donations are at work, it is expected that wages for similar workers will
be lower in nonprofits than in for-profit firms.3
Another possible reason for differences in pay comes from the screening
hypothesis of Hansmann (1980) and is related to the choice of organiza-
tional form described earlier. Hansmann (1980) examined a simple model in
which there are two types of managers. He suggested that if consumers are
not good judges of the quality of a service provided by an organization, then
some managers, by virtue of accepting lower wages, could make productive
signals to the uninformed consumers, and ‘‘the nonprofit form may both
restrain the managers of the organization, whatever their personal desires,
from profiteering at the expense of the organization’s patrons and may
select as managers precisely that class of individuals whose preferences are
most in consonance with the fiduciary role that the organization is destined
to serve.’’ In other words, heads of nonprofits essentially take lower wages
to signal that donations will be used effectively.
Workers in nonprofits may accept lower wages in exchange for a host of
pleasant amenities on their job, such as flexible hours, more stable job
3On the other hand, since managers in nonprofits are not constrained to keep wages low (as they
might if in competition with a for-profit firm), they may push wages up because it is a pleasant and easy
thing to do.
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prospects, and a slower pace of work (compensating differentials).4 An
additional reason for lower pay in nonprofits may be the differences in
returns to characteristics of managers and ability bias. Controlling for
ability across sectors is beyond the scope of this article, although it is
empirically testable if one had data on those individuals who switch
management jobs between sectors.
Data
Primary Sample. The data I use in this article are from tax returns of
501c(3) tax-exempt organizations. The primary sample includes organiza-
tions filing Form 990 returns each year from 1992 to 1996 (inclusive). The
original sample consists of 35,109 organization-years (on 10,539 unique
organizations). I delete from the sample those organizations which have
assets, expenses, revenue, program service expenses, grants, and other
expenses or top officer, director, or trustee compensation that is missing or
less than $1000. I also dropped organizations that have negative values for
management and general expenses, fund-raising expenses, or payments to
affiliates. The financial criteria reduces the sample by 2175 observations
(6.19 percent), and the compensation criteria reduces the sample by 788
observations (2.24 percent). These selection criteria reduce the sample to
32,146 organization-year observations over the 5 years (from 9776 unique
organizations). Due to the selection criteria, the results are more general-
izeable to larger nonprofits. These data come from the Statistics of Income
(SOI) files of the IRS. See Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin (1997) for
additional details on the data.
The IRS data contain a host of interesting information on the compen-
sation of all officers and directors and of the top five nonofficer/director/
trustee employees. For each officer, director, trustee, or other ‘‘key
employee,’’5 I have collected three measures of compensation: (1) base
compensation, including ‘‘salary, fees, bonuses, and severance payments
paid’’ (Internal Revenue Service 1996), (2) contributions to employee benefit
plans and deferred compensation, including ‘‘medical dental and life
insurance’’ (Internal Revenue Service 1996), and (3) expense account and
other allowances, including ‘‘expense allowances or reimbursements that
4See Young (1984) and James and Rose-Ackerman (1986).
5‘‘A ‘key’ employee is any person having responsibilities or powers similar to those of officers,
directors, or trustees. The term includes the chief management and administrative officials of an or-
ganization (such as an executive director or chancellor) but does not include the heads of separate
departments or smaller units within an organization’’ (Internal Revenue Service 1996).
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recipients must report as income on their separate income tax returns.’’
Examples include amounts for which the recipient did not account to the
organization or allowances that ‘‘were more than the payee spent on serving
the organization.’’ Organizations are required to include such payments as
‘‘the value of the personal use of housing, automobiles, or other assets owned
or leased by the organization’’ (Internal Revenue Service 1996). Means and
standard errors (in parentheses) for the sum of these three variables are
reported in Table 2. (Breakdowns by industry and type of pay are reported in
Table 3). The first officer or director earned, on average, $160,098 (all
financial data are reported in real 1996 dollars). A significant part of the
analysis that follows will focus on the total compensation, which includes the
sum of cash, benefits, and expense accounts of the top officer, director, or
trustee and of the top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee.
The average total compensation packages for the second and third
highest paid officers and directors were $122,381 and $111,530, which are
both substantially less than the average of $160,098 reported for the top
officer. The increase in average pay from position 3 to position 2 is 9.7
percent, and the increase in pay from position 2 to position 1 is 30.8 percent.
This result (ever-increasing pay as one moves up the organizational
hierarchy) is consistent with tournament theory (see Lazear and Rosen
1981).6 The top panel of Table 2 also reports mean total compensation for
the three highest paid nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employees.
These are relatively lower, ranging from $112,659 for the highest paid
nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee to $83,127 for the third
highest paid nonofficer nondirector or nontrustee employee.
These numbers can be compared with the average compensation of a set
of 6677 CEO-years collected from EXECUCOMP firms in the Standard &
Poor’s (S & P) 500, S & P Midcap 400, and S & P SmallCap 600 (1836
unique CEOs over 5 years from 1992 to 1996). The average salary and
bonus for this sample of CEOs is $910,942. The average compensation
including salary, bonus, other annual compensation; total value of
restricted stock granted; total value of stock options granted; long-term
incentive payouts; and other is $2,183,024. Clearly, on average, CEOs of
large firms earn more than heads of nonprofits. It is important to note,
however, that these firms are much larger than the sample of nonprofits
(this will be explored further later in the article).
6However, the average pay increases are substantially higher in for-profit firms [e.g., Main, O’Reilly,
and Wade (1993), who report the gain from the next-to-top to the top position to be on the order of 140
percent]. This might suggest that tournaments work less well in noprofits. There is further discussion of
tournaments in nonprofits below.
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The data also include financial information such as total assets, total
expenses, and revenue. The expenses are further broken down into several
categories, including (1) program services expenses, which are ‘‘mainly those
activities that the reporting organization was created to conduct and which,
along with many activities commenced subsequently, form the basis of the
organization’s current exemption from tax,’’7 (2) fund-raising expenses,
which are ‘‘total expenses incurred in soliciting contributions, gifts, grants,
etc.,’’ (3) management and general expenses, which are the ‘‘organization’s
expenses for overall function and management, rather than for its direct
conduct of fund-raising activities or program services,’’ including ‘‘legal
services, accounting, insurance, office management, personnel,’’ and other
expenses (Internal Revenue Service 1996), and (4) payments to affiliates.
These data are reported in the second panel of Table 2. The assets of these
organizations are substantial, averaging $62 million. The average revenue is
$60 million, and the average expenses are $55 million. A substantial fraction
of the expenses are spent on program services ($48 million) and a relatively
small fraction on fund raising.
I also have collected data on sources of support for the nonprofits under
study. In particular, I have included information on three measures of
outside support for the organizations as defined by the IRS: (1) public direct
support, (2) public indirect support, and (3) government grants. Public
direct support is the sum of ‘‘contributions, gifts, grants, and bequests that
the organization received directly from the public’’ (Internal Revenue
Service 1996). The average organization in the sample received $3.9 million
in public direct support each year during the sample period. Indirect public
support includes ‘‘total contributions received indirectly from the public
through solicitation campaigns conducted by federated fund-raising agen-
cies and similar fund-raising organizations (such as the United Way
organization and certain sectarian federations)’’ (Internal Revenue Service
1996). The average public indirect support each year during the sample
period was $653,911. Under the law, a government grant is ‘‘treated as a
contribution if its primary purpose is to enable the donee to provide a
service to, or maintain a facility for, the direct benefit of the public rather
than to serve the direct and immediate needs of the grantor even if the
public pays part of the expense of providing the service or facility’’ (Internal
Revenue Service 1996). The average charity received roughly $3.2 million in
7‘‘Program services include the organization’s unrelated trade or business activities. For example,
publishing a magazine is a program service even though the magazine contains both editorials and
articles that further the organization’s exempt purpose and advertising, the income from which is taxable
as unrelated business income’’ (Internal Revenue Service 1996).
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TABLE 2
Sample Means and Standard Errors
All years 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Compensationa (in 1996 dollars) :
Officer/director 1 160,098 153,591 163,463 162,832 161,708 158,511
(1,465) (2,149) (6,376) (2,176) (2,028) (1,879)
Officer/director 2 122,383 117,820 124,071 124,179 124,396 121,073
(803) (1,567) (2,287) (1,710) (1,843) (1,512)
Officer/director 3 111,531 107,206 114,901 112,685 112,657 110,046
(1,052) (1,665) (4,365) (1,693) (1,690) (1,537)
Employee 1 112,659 113,837 110,762 112,699 115,066 111,102
(956) (2,148) (1,557) (1,736) (2,743) (2,097)
Employee 2 92,242 93,946 93,968 92,715 91,099 90,230
(635) (1,432) (1,280) (1,405) (1,346) (1,533)
Employee 3 83,127 88,875 85,531 81,813 81,075 79,849
(973) (4,756) (1,173) (1,242) (1,232) (1,288)
Financial (in 1996 dollars):
Total assets 61,964,460 57,280,090 56,820,660 58,963,050 65,972,750 68,478,680
(1,781,228) (3,159,508) (2,988,762) (3,162,180) (4,664,855) (4,715,875)
Total expenses 55,368,840 59,307,150 57,752,460 57,693,480 54,812,440 49,116,677
(1,280,065) (3,355,222) (3,107,735) (3,059,692) (2,891,704) (2,071,322)
Prog. serv. expense 48,229,380 51,866,760 50,555,760 50,275,490 47,718,860 42,433,480
(1,209,423) (3,197,091) (2,951,454) (2,903,213) (2,740,749) (1,894,644)
Fund raising expense 422,558 417,195 402,477 425,593 429,113 434,363
(9,480) (21,969) (20,688) (20,023) (21,851) (20,893)
Mgt. & related expense 6,616,534 6,959,058 6,724,375 6,901,802 6,575,995 6,078,158
(100,384) (253,258) (224,686) (228,460) (217,964) (204,563)
Payments to affiliates 100,371 64,142 69,856 90,590 88,478 170,768
(13,798) (10,094) (10,458) (22,763) (14,535) (53,239)
Revenue 60,362,460 63,263,120 61,717,250 61,986,830 60,938,870 55,259,280
(1,331,542) (3,437,531) (3,193,056) (3,146,116) (3,037,675) (2,240,924)
Support (in 1996 dollars):
Public direct support 3,924,239 3,683,444 3,699,961 3,802,840 4,135,541 4,192,282
(89,403) (198,875) (194,869) (188,551) (211,098) (197,661)
Public indirect support 635,872 682,031 626,628 593,504 628,689 650,254
(45,997) (119,973) (105,743) (97,068) (94,550) (98,925)
Government grants 3,188,799 3,263,575 3,271,304 3,584,693 2,950,356 2,958,710
(131,662) (330,815) (310,063) (329,237) (269,910) (248,039)
Directors:
Uncompensated directors 20.462 19.232 20.448 20.799 20.630 20.958
(0.154) (0.385) (0.378) (0.371) (0.316) (0.290)
Compensated directors 4.061 4.076 3.967 4.189 4.093 3.991
(0.027) (0.067) (0.061) (0.066) (0.061) (0.054)
N 32146 5582 6082 6150 6817 7515
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
aCompensation defined as the sum of base pay, benefit plan contributions, plus expense accounts. These are broken into separate categories of pay (and by industry) in Table 3.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations for 1992–1996.
TABLE 3
Average Compensation of Top Employee and Top Officer and Director by Industry
Top officer or director Top employee
Number of
organizations Base pay
Benefits
package
Expense
account Base pay
Benefits
package
Expense
account
A. Arts, Culture, and Humanities 2,030 117,605 10,412 2,391 69,367 4,786 542
B. Educational Institutions and
Related Activities
7,420 125,429 15,143 4,495 93,109 9,255 782
C. Environmental Quality, Protection,
and Beautification
423 98,384 9,113 1,607 51,366 4,705 292
D. Animal Related 248 108,363 8,022 2,379 66,548 5,290 762
E. Health—General and Rehabilitative 11,554 187,379 20,064 3,369 159,247 10,025 853
F. Mental Health, Crisis Intervention 554 109,327 10,453 1,040 88,900 5,770 674
G. Disease, Disorders, Medical
Disciplines
424 159,196 15,918 2,821 117,375 10,355 757
H. Medical Research 376 205,025 19,020 6,581 115,567 12,105 6,094
I. Crime, Legal-Related 124 99,777 8,063 1,576 74,771 6,395 374
J. Employment, Job-Related 257 108,255 11,972 2,656 49,052 3,993 1,292
K. Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition 65 80,771 7,178 1,507 54,540 4,598 1,528
L. Housing, Shelter 522 72,092 4,177 946 33,537 2,093 90
M. Public Safety, Disaster
Preparedness, and Relief
39 161,908 18,295 2,138 58,614 4,528 672
N. Recreation, Sports. Leisure,
Athletics
268 108,054 9,548 3,373 61,523 7,638 3,040
O. Youth Development 383 89,048 8,297 1,119 45,404 4,359 426
P. Human Services—Multipurpose
and Other
3,262 94,874 8,195 1,660 54,051 4,396 419
Q. International, Foreign Affairs,
and National Security
402 126,566 14,535 3,121 83,901 9,421 2,634
R. Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy 53 122,724 7,961 4,685 98,951 4,843 307
S. Community Improvement, Capacity
Building
388 115,513 9,632 2,139 54,093 5,433 499
T. Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and
Grantmaking Foundations
1873 109,006 8,280 1,302 35,109 3,801 327
U. Science and Technology Research
Institutes, Services
401 188,523 19,431 3,994 109,241 14,537 1,869
V. Social Science Research Institutes,
Services
80 165,509 23,447 2,649 95,691 11,438 1,697
W. Public, Society Benefit: Multipurpose
and Other
170 164,847 27,383 1,096 98,305 11,999 659
X. Religion Related, Spiritual
Development
383 72,315 7,260 5,446 35,038 2,981 722
Y. Mutual/Membership Benefit
Organizations, Other
280 101,249 11,385 1,335 42,016 2,778 143
Z. Other 167 111,303 10,625 984 74,763 5,513 369
Note: Total of 32,144 organization-years represented. The rows represent the 26 major categories of the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE).
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations for years 1992–1996.
government grants in a typical year during the sample. The last panel of
Table 2 reports the average number of paid officers and directors (4) and the
average number of uncompensated officers, directors, or trustees (20).8
Industry Classifications. There is evidence in the literature on executive
compensation in firms that executive pay levels vary by industry. For
example, Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) show that CEOs in regulated
industries earn less than those in unregulated industries. Until recently,
there has been no system such as SIC codes for firms to classify the
substantially different missions of nonprofits even among those classified as
501c(3) organizations. However, the NTEE has been developed to help
classify charitable nonprofits into specific groups.
The four-character NTEE codes are similar to SIC codes for firms. There
are 26 ‘‘major groups’’ (listed in the left-hand column of Table 3), such as
Arts, Culture, and Humanities and Educational Institutions and Related
Activities, which comprise the first character of the codes. These 26 major
groups can be generalized into 10 ‘‘major categories’’: (1) Arts, Culture, and
Humanities, (2) Education, (3) Environment and Animals, (4) Health, (5)
Human Services, (6) International, Foreign Affairs, (7) Public, Societal
Benefit, (8) Religion Related, (9) Mutual/Membership Benefit, and (10)
Unknown. Under each of these 26 groups are two digits of subcodes that
make finer distinctions in organization type. The last of the four characters,
the ‘‘common code,’’ includes classifications such as Alliance Organizations,
Management and Technical Assistance Services, and Public Education.
There are a total of 645 unique subgroups in the NTEE. See Stevenson,
Pollak, and Lampkin (1997:Appendix B), Hodgkinson (1990), Hodgkinson
and Toppe (1991), Gronbjerg (1994), and Turner, Nygren, and Bowen (1992)
for more details on the NTEE. In several parts of the remainder of this article
I will control for industry effects by concentrating on the 26 major groups.
Table 3 reports some simple results of differences in compensation by
major nonprofit industry type for the top officer, director, or trustee and for
the top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee. This table also
separates total compensation into its three components: base pay, benefits
package, and expense account. The pattern that the top officer or director
earns more than the top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee as reported in
Table 2 is still evident in Table 3 (in fact, it is true in each group). It is also
clear that there is substantial variation in the levels of compensation within
8Bowen (1994) has an interesting discussion about compensation of trustees in nonprofits as well as a
more general discussion of leadership on boards of directors and comparisons between the for-profit and
nonprofit sectors.
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the nonprofit sector (across NTEE classifications). For example, the average
base pay for the top officer/director/trustee in the medical research sector
(category H) was $205,025, and the average in health, general and
rehabilitative (category E) was $187,379, whereas the average base pay for
the top officer/director/trustee in the category of religion-related (category
X) was $72,315, and the average in Housing, Shelter (category L) was
$72,092. There is also substantial variability in the value of the benefits
package offered to the top officers/directors/trustees from a high of $27,383
(Public, Society Benefit: Multipurpose and Other, category W) to a low of
$4,177 (Housing, Shelter). In addition, there is also significant variability in
the expense account category, which ranged from a high of $6,581 (Medical
Research, category H) to a low of $946 (Housing, Shelter). The ranges for the
top non-officer/director/trustees employees are similarly striking. Although
there has been only little work on specific industries within nonprofits [e.g.,
Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva (2000) for universities and Bertrand,
Hallock, and Arnould (2000) for hospitals], continued work might help us to
understand reasons for differences in pay across nonprofit industries.
Pay for Performance in Nonprofits
The relationship between performance of firms and the compensation of
CEOs has been widely studied in for-profit firms, but little attention has
been paid to nonprofits. In a few articles, however, Steinberg (1990a, 1990b)
and Weisbrod (1989) examine incentive compensation for employees in
nonprofits mostly from a theoretical point of view. We know that designing
incentive compensation plans in for-profit firms is difficult (Lazear 1995),
but it may be even more difficult to measure the performance of managers in
nonprofits because these organizations are likely to be striving to create
something much different from returns to shareholders. One feature that
makes nonprofits distinct from for-profit organizations is the nondistribu-
tion constraint (described earlier). This nondistribution constraint does not
imply, however, that employees cannot be paid based on incentives (see
Abelson 1998; Steinberg 1990b).
A classic example of howdifficult it is tomeasure performance formanagers
in the nonprofit sector is the case of a manager of a nursing home (Weisbrod
and Schlesinger 1986). Amanager could be paid based on the profits he or she
accrues, but this gives him or her incentives to provide lower-quality care to
the residents. The output sought by the board of the nursing home (say,
trustworthiness) is difficult to observe. We could try to measure trustworthi-
ness by using an easy-to-observemeasure such as themortality rate.However,
Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits / 391
this might induce management to admit residents who are mostly healthy,
which is, no doubt, at odds with the mission of the board.
The literature on CEO pay and firm performance provides several
common measures to test the top manager’s performance, among which are
stock returns and the change in market value or size of the firm. Since
nonprofits are not owned by shareholders, there is no stock price or value of
the nonprofits in the formal sense. The rest of this section is devoted to
several possible measures of performance for managers in nonprofits.
Charity Size and Managerial Pay. A host of articles, including Murphy
(1985), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Kostiuk (1990), Lambert, Larker,
and Weigelt (1991), and Rosen (1992), have documented a link between the
size or scale of a firm and the pay of the CEO.9 Firm size has been measured
in the executive pay literature by such variables as market value, assets, and
number of employees. One reason why we would expect managers of
nonprofits with more assets to earn more is that they have responsibility
over a much larger number of people and resources. Larger organizations
are more difficult to manage and therefore may require top executives with
scarce (and expensive) human capital.
Table 4, panel A, reports the results of an empirical examination of this
issue using the following very simple empirical specification:
Cit ¼ Sit þ i þ eit
where C is the log of manager compensation,10 S is the log net ending assets
of the organization, i represents organizations, t represents time in years, and
(i þ eit) is a composite error term containing possible permanent effects.11
The first column of Table 4, panel A, reports results from an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of ln(total compensation) for the top officer,
director, or trustee on ln(assets), a set of yearly indicator variables, and a
constant for the nonprofits. Log assets is a naturally important measure of
organization size of nonprofits (Salamon 1992). The coefficient on ln(assets)
9Also see Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), Agarwal (1981), and Westphal and Zajac (1994).
10In Table 4, panel A, and in each of the tables that follow, the results are not influenced significantly
by the specific definition of the dependent variable. That is, if I use ln(base pay), ln(base pay plus benefits),
or ln(base pay plus benefits plus expense accounts), I get roughly the same results. I present results using
the most comprehensive measure throughout the remainder of the article.
11It may seem reasonable to consider the compensation of a manager in the current period as a
function of performance in a prior period. However, much of the time t performance is obviously known
prior to setting time t pay. In addition to probably not being the correct specification from a conceptual
point of view, an additional drawback of using lagged values, of course, is the loss of an additional year
of data. In any event, repeating the analysis using lagged values of performance variables yields very
similar results.
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TABLE 4
Managerial Pay and Performance in Nonprofit Organizations: Organization Size
Panel A: Nonprofit organizations
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee For top nonofficer/nondirector/nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(assets) 0.218*** 0.206*** 0.047*** 0.173*** 0.160*** 0.010*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.137 0.172 0.797 0.180 0.311 0.829
N 32146 32146 32146 25197 25197 25197
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations, years 1992–1996.
Panel B: For-profit organizations
Dependent variable: ln(total compensation for CEO)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(assets) 0.256*** 0.310*** 0.242***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.030)
One-digit SIC No Yes No
Firm indicators No No Yes
R2 0.237 0.294 0.713
N 6677 6677 6677
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Yearly indicators are included in all regressions.
Source: Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP.
is 0.218 (t ¼ 71). This return number is large and significantly positive, as
expected, and is somewhat smaller than for CEOs of firms.12 This large effect,
taken at face value, suggests that larger firms pay their top managers more.
We know, though, that the compensation of managers varies by industry
(recall Table 3), so in column 2 of Table 4, panel A, I also control for the
industry in which the nonprofit operates. Even controlling for industry
effects, firm size [measured as ln(assets)] is still a substantial and important
contributor to top manager pay in this specification.
I performed a brief but similar analysis of the compensation of
managers in firms for comparability using data on 6677 firm-years from
1992 to 1996 from the S & P EXECUCOMP data described earlier. The
dependent variable is the log of total compensation. The main independ-
ent variable ln(assets) (I also control for yearly time indicators) is also
collected from EXECUCOMP. The regressions in Table 4, panel B, show
that the return to assets is much higher in for-profit firms than in
nonprofits. My results are consistent with those of other studies on CEO
pay in firms. Using other measures of CEO pay for firms (e.g., just
considering salary and bonus alone) as dependent variables yields similar
results. Just as there is a well-documented link between the size or scale of
a firm and CEO pay, there is a strong and positive link between the assets
of a charity and the pay of its top manager, although it is somewhat
weaker in nonprofits.
Clearly, however, firm size and industry effects do not fully explain top
manager pay in this sample of nonprofits (R2 in column 2 of Table 4, panel
A, is only 0.172). We need, therefore, to control for the possibility that other
characteristics of managers and organizations are confounding the rela-
tionship between firm size and managerial pay in nonprofits. To help
remedy this situation, I make use of the 6 years of IRS panel data. If one is
willing to assume that the source of endogeneity arises only through the
permanent component of the error term ai and not through the transitory
component eit, then the standard fixed-effects estimate of the preceding
equation will yield consistent estimates of the parameters. These results are
displayed in the third column of Table 4, panel A, and show that, even
controlling for organization fixed effects, the relationship between organ-
ization size and top manager pay remains. In other words, even within
organizations, as organizations grow, managers are paid more. This same
set of relationships holds for top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee
12Perhaps firm size as measured by assets is more closely related to pay in for-profit organizations
because size can be interpreted as the bottom line in for-profits but not in nonprofits. More work is
needed in this area.
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employees in the right three columns of Table 4, panel A, although the
coefficient estimates are smaller in each case.
As mentioned earlier, one problem with studying nonprofit organizations
is their myriad of different potential missions. With for-profit firms, the goal
or true measure of performance is increasing shareholder value, which many
authors (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990) measure with firm market value
(firm size). Table 5 relaxes the idea that the relationship between firm size
and managerial pay should be the same across all different nonprofit
TABLE 5
Relationship Between Managerial Pay and Organization Size in Nonprofits:
Dependent Variable is log(total annual compensation)
OLS regressions (no. of
organization effects)
A. Arts, Culture, and Humanities 0.245*** (0.010)
B. Educational Institutions and Related Activities 0.209*** (0.006)
C. Environmental Quality, Protection, and Beautification 0.135*** (0.026)
D. Animal Related 0.348*** (0.029)
E. Health—General and Rehabilitative 0.229*** (0.006)
F. Mental Health, Crisis Intervention 0.178*** (0.018)
G. Disease, Disorders, Medical Disciplines 0.184*** (0.030)
H. Medical Research 0.280*** (0.039)
I. Crime, Legal-Related 0.147*** (0.033)
J. Employment, Job-Related 0.205*** (0.024)
K. Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition 0.457*** (0.045)
L. Housing, Shelter 0.147*** (0.021)
M. Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, and Relief 0.318*** (0.102)
N. Recreation, Sports. Leisure, Athletics 0.190*** (0.032)
O. Youth Development 0.280*** (0.019)
P. Human Services—Multipurpose and Other 0.144*** (0.008)
Q. International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security 0.079*** (0.030)
R. Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy 0.199*** (0.050)
S. Community Improvement, Capacity Building 0.058** (0.030)
T. Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Grantmaking Foundations 0.217*** (0.016)
U. Science and Technology Research Institutes, Services 0.234*** (0.031)
V. Social Science Research Institutes, Services 0.247*** (0.078)
W. Public, Society Benefit: Multipurpose and Other 0.159** (0.064)
X. Religion Related, Spiritual Development 0.156*** (0.025)
Y. Mutual/Membership Benefit Organizations, Other 0.327*** (0.051)
Z. Other 0.199*** (0.041)
Note: Entries in table are coefficients on log(net ending assets) in compensation regression. Total of 32,146 organ-
ization years represented. The rows represent the 26 major categories of the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
(NTEE). Yearly indicators are included in all regressions. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations for years 1992–1996.
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industries while retaining the idea that net ending assets are an appropriate
measure of size for each organization.13 This table represents the results for
a set of regressions where the log of total compensation of the top officer,
director, or trustee is regressed on log net ending assets and a set of annual
time indicators by NTEE industry. It is clear that within each industry the
relationship between organizational size and managerial pay is positive and
significant. When individual organization fixed effects are controlled for
(not reported in the tables), most industries have a relationship between firm
size and managerial pay that is not statistically different from zero. This
may reflect the fact that the samples are relatively small within industries.
Clearly, organizational size is strongly linked with top manager pay. The
effect is tempered substantially when organization fixed effects are
controlled for. Oster (1998) compares the relationship between managerial
pay in nonprofits and organization size in various ways across selected
industries such as hospitals, social service organizations, and foundations.
In five separate samples of between 31 and 95 observations, she finds
coefficients on measures of size such as log(assets) in a managerial pay
regression in the range of 0.067 to 0.376. Oster’s (1998) work is very
informative but based on limited samples and is only cross-sectional. She
therefore cannot consider changes within organizations using organization-
specific effects.14
Other Measures of Performance. Although it is clear that firm size is
strongly related to managerial pay in nonprofits (even within organiza-
tions), it is useful to investigate whether there might be other measures.
Another possible choice is the fraction of expenses spent on program
services, a measure on which some groups of nonprofits seem to
concentrate.15 Each column of Table 6 represents the results from a
different OLS regression. Columns 1 through 3 report results when the
dependent variable is log(total compensation for the top officer, director, or
trustee). Columns 4 through 6 give the results when the dependent variable
is log(total compensation of the top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee).
The regressions also control for ln(assets) and yearly time indicators. In the
13Young (1984) examines compensation of nonprofit employees in various nonprofit industries,
including higher education, health care, and social services. His work suggests that there may be different
pay structures in different nonprofit industries.
14I cannot identify individual officers or employees by name, so I do not know when there is man-
agement turnover.
15The Council of Better Business Bureaus publishes a booklet entitled, Standard for Charitable
Solicitations. Among the recommendations is that ‘‘A reasonable percentage of income from all sources
shall be applied to programs and activities directly related to the purpose for which the organization
exists’’ (Council of Better Business Bureaus undated).
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simple cross section for the top officer, director, or trustee, it is clear that
higher levels of expenses going to program services are associated with
higher pay (the coefficient estimate is 0.098). This result does not hold when
we control for NTEE effects in column 2 or when we control for
organization fixed effects in column 3.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 examine the compensation of the top nonofficer,
nondirector, or nontrustee employee, and the results differ somewhat. In the
simple cross section, the link between performance and pay is much stronger
(0.591), and the result is still significantwhen 26NTEE industry classifications
are controlled for. However, within an organization (controlling for
organization fixed effects), there is no link between top nonofficer, nondirec-
tor, or nontrustee pay and this measure of performance (column 6).16
Since the performance results are not particularly robust, it seems
reasonable to investigate them further. Therefore, I reran the regressions
from Table 6 by NTEE (industry) classification (26 possibilities) while still
accounting for individual organization fixed effects (I have not reported the
TABLE 6
Managerial Pay and Performance in Nonprofit Organizations:
Performance Measured as Program Service Expense as Fraction
of Total Expense
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Prog. expense)/total expense 0.098*** 0.032 0.025 0.589*** 0.381*** 0.033
(0.036) (0.036) (0.048) (0.027) (0.025) (0.035)
Ln(assets) 0.217*** 0.206*** 0.048*** 0.171*** 0.159*** 0.010*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.137 0.172 0.797 0.196 0.317 0.829
N 32146 32146 32146 25197 25197 25197
Note: Measure of performance (program service expense)/(total expense). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **,
and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Yearly indicators are included in all
regressions.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations, years 1992–1996.
16One possible reason for this is that there is little variation in the performance variable (program
service expense/total expense) within organizations over time. In fact, this is not the case. For example,
although the median percentage change in this performance measure over the 5 years is zero, the
percentage change at the 10th percentile of changes is –0.094 and at the 90th percentile of changes is
0.099.
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results in the tables). Only two of the individual industries show significantly
positive returns on the fraction of expenses spent on program services. There
is only a very weak link between pay and performance based on this measure.
Nonprofits that spend higher fractions of their total expenses on actual
program services tend to pay their top officers, directors, and trustees and
top nonofficer, nondirector, and nontrustee staff more in the cross section,
but further analysis suggests that this result is not particularly robust.
While, clearly, success in fund raising may be an important metric by
which to evaluate managers of nonprofits, another possible measure of
performance could be the combination of government grants and direct and
indirect support from the public. The results of this investigation are
reported for the two types of managers in Table 7. In this case, even
conditional on assets of the organization and with controls for NTEE
industries or organization indicators, the higher the outside fund raising, the
higher is the pay of the manager.
There is a host of other potential ways to measure performance in
nonprofits. These include nonprofit profits, defined as total revenue minus
expenses (median level in this sample $1,117,222), and return on assets,
defined as profits/assets (median level in this sample 7.01 percent). However,
from an empirical point of view, neither of these measures is really related to
compensation of the managers of the nonprofits. This may be due to the fact
TABLE 7
Managerial Pay and Performance in Nonprofit Organizations:
Performance Measured as Log of the sum of Government Grants,
Public Direct Support, and Public Indirect Support
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (grants + support) 0.026*** 0.064*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.046*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Ln(assets) 0.206*** 0.169*** 0.034*** 0.193*** 0.148*** 0.016**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.163 0.204 0.789 0.213 0.356 0.835
N 28051 28051 28051 22719 22719 22719
Note: Support is the sum of public direct support and public indirect support. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Yearly indicators are included in
all regressions.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations, years 1992–1996.
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that there are wide differences in the missions of most nonprofits. In the end,
the measures of nonprofit size (including net ending assets)17 seem most
appropriate as measures of performance.
As an additional examination of the issue of performance in nonprofits, I
analyze (but do not report in the tables) the issue of relative performance
evaluation [see Antle and Smith (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) for
a discussion of relative performance evaluation in for-profit firms]. In this
analysis I estimated empirical specifications much like those in Table 6 with
the additional covariate of average performance (program service expense/
total expense) in that organization’s industry (defined as one of the 26
NTEE industries detailed in the left hand column of Table 3). I find no
evidence of relative performance evaluation for top managers in nonprofits.
While performance by some metric may matter (although the results are not
particularly robust) for the pay of managers in nonprofits, there is no
evidence that it is measured relative to others.
Government Grants and the Pay of Managers in Nonprofits
All 501c(3) nonprofits ‘‘are entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions
and are defined by the IRS as ‘charitable’ because they serve broad policy
purposes’’ (Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin 1997). Considerable work has
been done on issues of government crowd-out with regard to donations.18
From a conceptual point of view, government grantsmaymean one of several
different things for the pay of managers of nonprofits. First, they could be a
sign of organizational quality or managerial ability. That is, in the cross
section, we might expect that those organizations with grants or those with
larger grants should have managers who are paid more. However, within
organizations (where industry type, organization quality, and managerial
ability are fixed), more government grants may be a sign of some sort of
outside monitoring of the manager or an increase in funding attracted by the
manager.19
These ideas suggest the following simple modification of the earlier
equation:
17As stated earlier, other measures of organization size, such as revenues, yield very similar results.
18For example, Rose-Ackerman (1987) studies issues related to whether government grants served as
substitutes for private donations from a theoretical point of view.
19Others also may monitor the actions of managers in nonprofits such as donors and volunteers. Each
of these constituents has an important stake in the organization. Unfortunately, data are not available to
explore these issues empirically in this article.
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Cit ¼ Sit þ Gitþ i þ eit
And this includes the addition of government grants Git. I describe the
precise definition of Git below. Regressions of this form are reported in
Table 8. The first three columns are for the compensation of the top officer,
director, or trustee, and the last three are for the compensation of the top
nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee. The top panel defines Git ¼ 1 if there
is any government grant and 0 otherwise, and the bottom panel defines
Git ¼ log(grant size in dollars) for all organizations with positive grants. In
column 1 of Table 8, panel A, the log of total compensation of the top
TABLE 8
Government Grants and Managerial Pay in Nonprofits
Panel A: Examination of the existence of a government grant in a nonprofit
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government grant 0.165*** 0.213*** 0.007 0.015 0.125*** 0.003
(Any grant ¼ 1) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Ln(assets) 0.213*** 0.199*** 0.047*** 0.174*** 0.156*** 0.011*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.143 0.181 0.797 0.180 0.319 0.829
N 32146 32146 32146 25197 25197 25197
Panel B: Examination of the size of the government grant
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(value of government 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.062*** 0.005
grant) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Ln(assets) 0.201*** 0.184*** 0.031** 0.184*** 0.164*** 0.016*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.218 0.246 0.765 0.252 0.426 0.872
N 13043 13043 13043 11307 11307 11307
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. Yearly indicator variables are included in all regressions.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations, years 1992–1996.
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manager is regressed on an indicator for whether a government grant exists,
a constant, a measure of organization size (log assets), and a set of yearly
time indicators. The coefficient 0.165 suggests that organizations that have
government grants pay their managers on average 17 percent more than
those which do not have grants. Once individual organization fixed effects
are controlled for in column 3 of Table 8, panel A, the effect of grants is
slightly negative (but not significant).20 Roughly the same results come out
of similar analyses in the rest of the panel.21
This suggests that in the cross section, organizations that receive grants
pay their managers more but that within organizations (i.e., once organiza-
tional quality or managerial ability are fixed) managers with grants may be
paid the same or slightly less. That is, within an organization, adding a grant
does not increase and actually may decrease managerial pay.22
Managers of nonprofits are paid more on average when they generate
grants, but this is not true within organizations. Clearly, certain kinds of
organizations that pay managers well generate relatively large amounts of
grant money. However, top managers in nonprofits are not additionally
compensated when their organizations generate new (or additional)
government grants.
Governance in Nonprofits: The Role of Boards in Managerial Pay
There is some evidence that the makeup of the board of directors may
have some influence on managerial pay or turnover in for-profit firms (e.g.,
Weisbach 1988; Main, O’Reilly, and Wade 1995; and Hallock 1997, 1999).
Despite some excellent work in the area (e.g., Bowen 1994), little is known
about governance in nonprofit organizations, and even less is known about
the compensation structure for the managers who lead these organizations.
This section contains an investigation of the effects of board structure on
the compensation of managers and top employees in nonprofits.
Hallock (1997) presents cross-sectional results that show that, controlling
for the levels of assets, stock performance, and CEO characteristics, CEOs
20The chi-square value of the Hausman test of the fixed-effects specification in Table 8 versus the
random effects specification is highly significant (p < 0:001) and indicates that inferences based on the
specifications reported in Table 8 are most appropriate.
21Since the definition of government grants in panel B of Table 8 drops 59 percent of the observations,
a referee suggested that I instead use log(value of government grants + 1) as the main independent
variable in this model. If I recomputed the analysis in this way, the qualitative results are similar, the
significance levels remain the same, and all coefficients are reduced in absolute value.
22See Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989, 1994), Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987), Zajac and
Westphal (1994), and Hallock (1997) for related literature in firms.
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who lead for-profit firms with larger boards earn more. However, nonprofit
organizations are different in many ways, and their boards may be serving a
different function (Bowen 1994). Perhaps larger boards suggest that there is
more monitoring, and therefore, lower-quality managers are needed or at
least managers who are paid less.
Table 9 presents the results from regressions of a similar form as in the
preceding tables with the addition of a variable on the number of board
directors in the nonprofit organization. The results for the top officer,
director, or trustee are reported in the first three columns and for the top
TABLE 9
The Effect of Board Composition on Managerial Pay in Nonprofits
Panel A: Board size measured by number of paid directors
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of paid directors 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(assets) 0.223*** 0.215*** 0.050*** 0.160*** 0.151*** 0.012**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.138 0.175 0.796 0.186 0.317 0.829
N 32146 32146 32146 25197 25197 25197
Panel B: Board size measured by number of unpaid directors
Dependent variable: ln(base pay + benefits + expense account)
For top officer/director/trustee
For top nonofficer/nondirector/
nontrustee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of unpaid directors 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ln(assets) 0.210*** 0.195*** 0.047*** 0.176*** 0.159*** 0.011*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
NTEE indicators No Yes No No Yes No
Org. indicators No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.147 0.185 0.797 0.183 0.310 0.829
N 32146 32146 32146 25197 25197 25197
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. Yearly indicators are included in all regressions.
Source: IRS Tax Form 990 for individual organizations, years 1992–1996.
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nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee in the last three. Panel A
reports results on the link between managerial pay and the number of paid
board members, whereas panel B reports results on the link between
managerial pay and the number of unpaid directors.
Some researchers including, Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) have tested
tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981) in large for-profit firms by including
the number of vice presidents in a standard CEO pay regression. The idea is
that, conditional on other factors, CEO pay should be higher in the
presence of more vice presidents because more individuals are in compe-
tition for the top spot in the firm. In the case of this article, however, board
members are not as likely as vice presidents in for-profit firms to compete
for the top position, so the tournament theory is not necessarily testable in
this way in nonprofits.23
Panel A of Table 9 shows that the larger the board, the less the top officer,
director, or trustee is paid. This is true even when controlling for 26 NTEE
classifications (column 2) and for individual organization fixed effects
(column 3). For the top nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee, in
the simple cross section and when controlling for 26 NTEE industry effects,
the larger the board, the higher is the pay of the employee. However, when
individual organization fixed effects are controlled for, the same negative
result (larger board, less pay) appears. The results are less robust in panel B
of Table 9 when the effect of unpaid directors is examined.
Again, the results in this section are not entirely clear. Perhaps board
members serve as substitutes formanagement experience. Therefore, as board
sizes grow, there is less need for a highly paid top officer, director, or trustee or
nonofficer, nondirector, or nontrustee employee because larger paid boards
may be able to more easily manage organizations than smaller boards.
Another explanation may be that it is easier for larger boards to monitor the
operations of organizations, and therefore, organizations with larger boards
may not require managers with high salaries. The differing results for the
unpaid/paidmembers suggests that amore detailed examination of the effects
of boards on managerial pay in nonprofits would be interesting.
Concluding Comments
There is an expansive theoretical and empirical body of work on the
compensation of managers of firms in the United States (e.g., Murphy 1999)
23Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) also show further support for tournament theory in for-profit
firms in that the larger the firm, the larger is the pay gap at the top.
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and some basic theoretical work on compensation in nonprofits that can be
applied to managers of nonprofit organizations. However, little is known
about the compensation of managers of nonprofits from an empirical point
of view. This article presents evidence on the compensation of top managers
of nonprofits in the United States using a very large amount of previously
unexplored data from tax returns of the organizations.
Among the main empirical findings are that pay levels of top officers and
directors of charities average about $160,000, not close to those reported for
heads of large U.S. firms. Just as there is a well-documented link between
organization size and managerial pay in for-profit firms, there is a similar
relationship in nonprofits. Also, there is substantial variability in the pay of
topmanagers of charities, within the charities and across types of charities, as
defined by their NTEE industries. In addition, a reasonably large fraction of
the compensation of top officers, directors, and trustees and of top nonofficer,
nondirector, or nontrustee employees comes in the form of benefit plans and
expense accounts. It is also the case that although in the simple cross section
nonprofits with higher levels of government grants pay their heads more, this
is not true once organization fixed effects are accounted for. This may be due
to the fact that government agencies monitor managerial actions, and
managers can be paid less in the presence of this monitoring. Similarly, there
is a weak negative relationship between the number of paid board members
and managerial pay in nonprofits, suggesting, perhaps, that paid boards of
directors substitute for managerial talent.
Recently, there has been increased emphasis on the compensation and
governance of managers in nonprofits (e.g., Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 1996).
However, very little is known about the pay of these managers. 501c(3)
nonprofits seem to be a relatively narrow set of organizations. However, one
possibility is that they actually perform significantly different tasks and
therefore are organized quite differently from one another. This may lead, in
turn, to differences in the way they pay their managers. This article is an
important first step in studying the pay of managers in these types of
organizations. Hopefully, these basic findings can help inform the issues and
motivate further research in the area.
References
Abelson, Reed. 1998. ‘‘Nonprofit Work Gets Profitable.’’ New York Times,’’ Sunday March 29.
Agarwal, Naresh L. 1981. ‘‘Determinants of Executive Compensation.’’ Industrial Relations 20
(Winter):36–46.
Antle, Rick, and Abbie Smith. 1986. ‘‘An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evalu-
ation of Corporate Executives.’’ Journal of Accounting Research 24(Spring):1–39.
404 / Kevin F. Hallock
Bertrand, Marianne, Kevin F. Hallock, and Richard Arnould. 2000. ‘‘Does Managed Care Change the
Mission of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence from the Managerial Labor Market.’’ Working paper
no. 7924,’’ Cambridge, MA.
Bowen, William, G. 1994. Inside the Boardroom. New York: Wiley.
———, Thomas Nygren, Sarah E. Turner, and Elizabeth A. Duffy. 1994. The Charitable Nonprofits: An
Analysis of Institutional Dynamics and Characteristics. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Council of Better Business Bureaus. Undated. CBBB Standards for Charitable Solicitations. Arlington,
VA: CBBB.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., John J. Cheslock, and Julia Epifantseva. 2000. ‘‘Paying Our Presidents: What Do
Trustees Value?’’ NBER Working Paper No. 7886, Cambridge, MA.
Finkelstein, Sydney, and Donald Hambrick. 1989. ‘‘Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the
Intersection of Markets and Political Processes.’’ Strategic Management Journal 10(March-
April):121–34.
——— and ———. 1996. Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effect on Organizations. New
York: West Publishing.
Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1990. ‘‘Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive
Officers,’’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(February):30S–51S.
Gomez-Mejia, Luis, Henry Tosi, and Timothy Hinkin. 1987. ‘‘Managerial Control, Performance, and
Executive Compensation.’’ Academy of Management Journal 30(March):51–70.
Gronbjerg, Kristin A. 1994. ‘‘Using NTEE to Classify Non-profit Organizations: An Assessment of
Human Service and Regional Applications.’’ Voluntas 5(3):301–28.
Hallock, Kevin F. 1997. ‘‘Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation.’’
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32(September):331–44.
———. 1999 ‘‘Dual Agency: Corporate Boards with Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships.’’ In
Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence, edited by Jennifer Car-
penter and David Yermack, pp. 55–75. Dorrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
Hansmann, Henry B. 1980. ‘‘The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise.’’ Yale Law Journal 89(April):835–98.
———. 1996. The Ownership of Enterprise. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Hodgkinson, Virginia A. 1990. ‘‘Mapping the Nonprofit Sector in the United States: Implications for
Research.’’ Voluntas 12(2):6–32.
——— and Christopher M. Toppe. 1991. ‘‘A New Research and Planning Tool for Managers: The
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities.’’ Nonprofit Management and Leadership 1(Summer):403–
14.
Internal Revenue Service. 1996. Instructions to Form 990. Washington: IRS.
James, Estelle, and Susan, Rose-Ackerman. 1986. The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies. New
York: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Jensen, Michael, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1990. ‘‘Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives.’’
Journal of Political Economy 98(April):225–64.
Joskow, Paul, Nancy Rose, and Andrea Shepherd. 1993. ‘‘Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compen-
sation.’’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1:1–58.
Kostiuk, Peter F. 1990. ‘‘Firm Size and Executive Compensation.’’ Journal of Human Resources
25(Winter):90–105.
Lambert, Richard A., David F. Larker, and Keith Weigelt. 1991. ‘‘How Sensitive is Executive Com-
pensation to Organization Size.’’ Strategic Management Journal 12(July):395–402.
Lazear, Edward P. 1995. Personnel Economics. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.
——— and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. ‘‘Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.’’ Journal of
Political Economy 89(October):841–64.
Main, Brian G. M., Charles A. O’Reilly III, and James Wade. 1993. ‘‘Top Executive Pay: Tournament
or Teamwork?’’ Journal of Labor Economics 11(October):606–8.
———, ———, and ———. 1995. ‘‘The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive Compensation:
Economic and Psychological Perspectives.’’ Industrial and Corporate Change 4:293–32.
Mirvis, P. H., and E. J. Hackett. 1983. ‘‘Work and Work Force Characteristics in the Nonprofit Sector.’’
Monthly Labor Review 106(April):3–12.
Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits / 405
Murphy, Kevin J. 1985. ‘‘Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Ana-
lysis.’’ Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(April):11–42.
———. 1999. ‘‘Executive Compensation’’. In Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3B, edited by Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card, pp. 2485–2563. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Oster, Sharon. 1998. ‘‘Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector.’’ Nonprofit Management and
Leadership 8(Spring):207–21.
Preston, Anne. 1989. ‘‘The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World.’’ Journal of Labor Economics
7(October):438–3.
———. 1990. ‘‘Women in the White-Collar Nonprofit Sector: The Best Option or the Only Option?’’
Review of Economics and Statistics 72(November):560–8.
———. 1994. ‘‘Women in the Nonprofit Labor Market.’’ In Women and Power in the Nonprofit Sector,
edited by T. Odendahl and M. O’Neil, pp. 39–77. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1987. ‘‘Ideals versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government
Grants.’’ Journal of Political Economy 95(August):810–23.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1992. ‘‘Contracts and the Market for Executives. In Main Currents in Contract Eco-
nomics, edited by L. Werin and H. Wijkander, pp. 181–211. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Salamon, Lester M. 1992. America’s Nonprofit Sector: A Primer. New York: The Foundation Center.
Steinberg, Richard. 1990a. ‘‘Labor Economics and the Nonprofit Sector: A Literature Review.’’ Non-
profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 19(Summer):151–70.
———. 1990b. ‘‘Profits and Incentive Compensation in Nonprofit Firms.’’ Nonprofit Management and
Leadership 1(Winter):137–52.
Stevenson, David R., Thomas H. Pollak, and Linda M. Lampkin (with Kathryn L. S. Pettit and
Nicholas A. J. Stengel). 1997. State Nonprofit Almanac 1997: Profiles of Charitable Organizations.
Washington: Urban Institute Press.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, July 30, 1996, Public Law 104–168, Internal Revenue Service.
Tosi, Henry L., Jr., and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia. 1989. ‘‘The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance:
An Agency Theory Perspective.’’ Administrative Science Quarterly 34(June):169–89.
——— and ———. 1994. ‘‘CEO Compensation Monitoring Firm Performance.’’ Academy of Man-
agement Journal 37(August):1002–16.
Turner, Sarah E., Thomas I. Nygren, and William G. Bowen. 1992. ‘‘The NTEE Classification System:
Tests of Reliability in the Field of Higher Education.’’ Voluntas 4(1):73.
Weisbach, Michael. 1988. ‘‘Outside Directors and CEO Turnover.’’ Journal of Financial Economics
20(January-March):431–60.
Weisbrod, Burton A. 1983. ‘‘Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials Among
Lawyers.’’ Journal of Labor Economics 1(July):246–63.
———. 1989. ‘‘Rewarding Performance That is Hard To Measure: The Private Nonprofit Sector.’’
Science 244(5):541–6.
——— and Mark Schlesinger. 1986. ‘‘Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the Response to
Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes.’’ In The Economics of Nonprofit Institu-
tions: Studies in Structure and Policy, edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, pp. 133–51. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Westphal, James D., and Edward J. Zajac. 1994. ‘‘Substance and Symbolism in CEO’s Long-Term
Incentive Plans.’’ Administrative Science Quarterly 39(September):367–90.
Young, Dennis R. 1984. ‘‘Performance and Reward in Nonprofit Organizations: Evaluation, Com-
pensation, and Personal Incentives.’’ Yale Program on Nonprofit Organizations Working Paper
No. 79. New Haven.
Zajac, Edward J., and James D. Westphal. 1994. ‘‘The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and
Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When More Is Not Better?’’ Strategic Management
Journal 15(Winter):121–42.
406 / Kevin F. Hallock
